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and human wellbeing. As such it supports a consequentialist ethic that can be more successful than deontological approaches (see Glossary) in securing consensus and motivating action [1] . However, criticisms of the ESF as a tool for conservation raise doubts about its effectiveness and legitimacy [2, 3] . The most controversial issue is probably that of monetisation, as laid out recently by Silvertown [4] . One set of responses to such problems would continue using the ESF as a general tool for assessing habitats while recognising its multilayered structure [5] , supervising it to avoid unintended consequences [6] , perhaps discouraging monetisation [7] , and even attempting to subjugate intrinsic value under the category of services [8] . Yet there are more profound problems with the ESF that call for a radical shift if we wish to contribute to conservation as part of a sustainable development agenda. Two outstanding issues are sufficient, in our opinion, to demand an overhaul of the ESF so radical as to require a new name. First, the definitions do not work. The fact that definitions of 'ecosystem services' (ES) and of specific categories are often vague, tautologous and/or at variance with the concepts actually employed is symptomatic of deep-seated problems, as we shall explain.
Second, collapsing multiple human value judgments into one or a few numerical values is a form of devaluation. We unpack this claim by exploring the inescapably cultural foundation of valuation processes.
Coupling the ESF with the concern for sustainable development leads to the concept of natural capital, which is posited as underpinning (and sometimes including) ES [9] . Taken as the underlying substance that must be conserved in order to maintain delivery of ES, natural capital is prone to similar criticisms, although less susceptible to financial trading. The solution we will propose, by contrast, shifts focus from commodities to relationships between specific stakeholders and places [10] .
What exactly is an ecosystem service?
Definitions of ES [11] range from "the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems…sustain and fulfil human life" [12] through "the outputs of ecosystems from which people derive benefits" [13] to "the benefits people obtain from ecosystems" [14] ; cf [15] . The variety of focal nouns in this sample of definitions (conditions, processes, outputs and benefits) reveals the difficulty of finding a logical category for things that motivate humans to protect natural habitats and places [16] . Fisher, Turner and Morling [17] , affirming that ES must both be ecological and lead to human benefits, define ES as "the aspects of ecosystems utilized (actively or passively) to produce human well-being". We find 'aspect' a more useful term, though not for something 'utilized'. In fact, a minimal set of commonly-studied ES cannot logically be covered by any of the above definitions (Table 1) -and some studies [18] seem unconstrained by any of them. A definition encompassing all of these definitions would have to be very broad -something like "those ecological processes and their effects that certain humans appreciate". But thanks to the existence of appreciative ecologists, such a definition would have unlimited scope. Some other posited ES cannot be construed in a way that fulfils any of the above definitions. For example, animal welfare is considered in the UK National Ecosystem Assessment [13], yet its beneficiaries are not human unless we consider the satisfaction of concerned humans (in which case any ecological state of affairs that makes someone happier is an ES). Meanwhile, the biodiversity of an area [19] is sometimes considered an ES, and a subtle semantic shift from 'biological diversity' as an index (an intangible metric of diversity) [20] to 'biodiversity' being an actual aggregate (almost a synonym for 'assemblage') [21] allows biodiversity to be simultaneously presented as also underpinning all other ES and having 'existence value' [5] . The value of such concepts of biodiversity is not in question, but to construe any of them as a process, output or human benefit seems illogical.
Looking at the definitions of categories of ES, problems are multiplied. Take the four categories of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [22] , three of which also form the basis of the Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services [23] . Perhaps 'provisioning services' is unproblematic -indeed a good model for ES, since beneficiaries in this case are consumers who consciously value the foodstuffs and raw materials that come under this category. 'Regulating services' might raise the question as to where a target value or set point for regulation can come from [24] -short of accepting something like the Gaia Hypothesis [25] . Presumably the term is simply meant to denote ecological effects that mimic the regulation that one might wish for, or that generally slow environmental change [26] . Regulating services are not clarified by the tautology engendered when the word 'regulation' is normally repeated within the definitions of examplesapart from pollination [22] , the 'regulatory' sense of which remains unclear to us. 'Supporting services' [2] and 'cultural services' [27] , meanwhile, are simply too broad. The former potentially includes every conceivable ecological process, since benefits for the well-being of someone can always be posited, while the latter potentially includes every positive human attitude to any element of the environment. The breadth of these categories exacerbates the risk of double-counting, while the vagueness makes a balanced audit elusive: how could one ever assess the 'supporting disservices' or 'cultural disservices' of an ecosystem? Below we argue that these last two categories of ES represent complementary but contrasting approaches to motivating nature conservation: each can ground a whole framework for analysis.
Parallel problems emerge for other concepts that might be used in a definition of ES, such as 'processes/functions; structural components; goods; human uses; securities' [11] . The hope is sometimes expressed that definitional problems will decline as definitions gradually improve [3] .
But the problems we face are not merely about vagueness; they arise from forcing distinct concepts into a single semantic category. The examples under 'Valuing Ecosystems' below suggest how they may continue fostering blind spots, unintended consequences and mistrust until the confusion is resolved.
How do humans value?
'Value' is a multivalent English word that can hinder logical analysis. Before advocating its use as a verb, we outline three of its divergent meanings as a noun that are highly relevant : economic, ethical and numerical. There is, firstly, an unavoidable economic aspect to nature conservation, in that some kind of prioritisation has to be made in the face of competing land-use claims. This in turn should reflect people's values -their ethics -and need not entail monetisation, or any common currency of assessment at all. A single numerical value, therefore, cannot capture the diverse ways in which people may value a given place, important though it is to quantify these. A prominent strand of value theory (Box 1) argues for the irreducible plurality of evaluative concepts, and everyday experience shows that people both perceive and value such goods as health, utility, diversity, beauty and generosity in different ways [28] . Compressing assessments of such distinct 'values' onto a smaller number of axes ignores the intrinsic dimensionality of the situation and is a form of devaluation [2] . It may also produce category errors, helping to explain the definitional problems outlined above. By reducing a broad range of human motives to the category of services, the ESF reveals the influence of the rational-choice paradigm of microeconomics [29] and fails to do justice to the reality of human attitudes towards places and their conservation. This we explore in the next section.
Further complexity is added by the plurality of stakeholders. Beneficiaries are often specified on an ad-hoc basis, without regard to their socio-economic status [2] or not at all, as if everyone appreciated the same benefits equally [30] . Yet ecosystems do not produce a pool of benefits independently of actual beneficiaries. Rather, benefits arise from particular people's interactions with particular places [31] , often with technological input, communication, legal facilitation and many other cultural factors [32] . It is too easy to conceive of ES emanating from abstract classes of habitat, overlooking the uniqueness of places that can make them valuable to particular people. Yet surveys of stakeholders tend to emphasise cultural ES associated with the distinctiveness of places [33] . Only when interest groups are poorly or narrowly specified or when certain groups are excluded from the process is it possible to proceed to a summary valuation. "The current campaign to define the world as an immense collection of service commodities" [34] then allows marketisation and legislation that, one might suspect, enable owners of capital to be served as the ultimate beneficiaries [2] . The emerging discipline of political ecology is bringing important scrutiny of conservation agendas in the light of considerations of equity and power.
Valuing ecosystems
Valuation must be seen as a complex human cultural process -and not merely in assessing cultural ES [35] . Indeed, the ubiquitous yet vague 'cultural services' category probably derives from "perceptions of culture as opposed to nature, biased towards globalized Eurocentric leisure-time concepts", etc, reflecting the captivity of Western thought to a dualism of the immaterial and the subjective vs. the material and the objective [36] . It can be argued that all ES, insofar as they motivate conservation, are psycho-socio-culturally mediated [2, 34] . For example, even the provisioning of wheat by the world's major agroecosystems is an ES only in virtue of consumers' cultural conditioning to eat certain foods, and the loss of this service could, hypothetically, be accommodated by a corresponding shift in diets. Readers unconvinced about this point might instead appreciate the evolutionary psychology of valuation: how one's perceptions might reflect processes that tend to increase one's inclusive fitness [37] . In either case, contextual awareness must remain acutely important for understanding disagreements, potential disbenefits and conflicts of interest [35] .
We end our critique by mentioning some examples of conservation motivations that are difficult to capture in the ESF. Several studies have documented how people appreciate places by serving them and their constituent organisms rather than considering themselves served by an ecosystem [38] and by giving up time to protect or improve them [39, 40] . To these we add a brief example of stakeholder exclusion in conservation negotiations. Grazing on the Sinai Peninsula is said to damage scarce vegetation, and domestic grazing in the St Katherine Protectorate has been outlawed and in some areas physically prevented, despite being central to the livelihoods of people who traditionally graze their flocks in these habitats [41] . A conservation-oriented analysis of this complicated situation should recognise how the Bedouin people benefit from these arid lands in ways that are apparently disregarded by interventions focusing on the interests of other beneficiaries. It should also consider the contested ecology of the situation, where local people claim that their grazing actually improves survival in grazed species [42] .
What is needed is a framework that consistently distinguishes ecological processes from human modes of appreciating them. A proper treatment should be intrinsically multi-dimensional and recognise mutual human-environment relationships [10] involving diverse stakeholders.
Beyond services: introducing the Ecosystem Valuing Framework
We suggest that conservationists should avoid the language of services altogether and adopt a framework that recognises diverse aspects of human valuation for specified people and places. To facilitate this, we here propose an ecosystem valuing framework. This explicitly recognises that human experience provides the starting point for analysing the full range of ways in which ecosystems may be appreciated. This may be seen as a strategy of developing the 'cultural services' category; in closing we will briefly consider what can still be done with the popular approach of starting with ecological processes.
To understand ecosystem valuation we ideally need a comprehensive set of logically-distinct possible ways in which people may value natural places, and we find a candidate suite of axes in aspectual theory. This philosophical framework (Box 1) proposes distinct, mutually-irreducible aspects of reality that are experienced by humans (Table 2) . Taking the first three of these aspects as foundational, our proposal is that the remaining 12 aspects (Fig. 1 ) be used to capture the range of ways in which humans may stand in evaluative relationships with natural places. These 12 dimensions collectively cover ecological, cognitive, communal and ideological aspects of valuation, and there are philosophical reasons to believe that they are both comprehensive and mutually exclusive (Box 1). For a given real place and a specified stakeholder, then, we ask how the stakeholder appreciates the place in these kinds of ways. That is, the aspects are adverbs rather than nouns. Table 2 illustrates how these aspects cover and exceed the range of the ESF.
We suggest that an ecosystem valuing framework (EVF) such as this provides the flexibility and simplicity needed for handling a complex multidimensional problem. It is designed to maintain the pragmatic, pluralistic orientation of the ESF while improving on it in important ways (Box 2).
Clearly this proposal calls for considerable inter-disciplinary collaboration and public engagement. Fig. 1 suggests how each of the 12 aspects tends to be the focal concern of a particular group of stakeholders, and how it connects with a recognised category of value.
Outlook
There are several further reasons why the EVF should have intuitive appeal for scientists, policymakers and practitioners. First, it has the potential to meet various recommendations previously made for implementation of the ESF, including resilience, promotion of interdisciplinary collaboration and involvement of stakeholders [11] , focus on direct human encounters with ecosystems and attention to both local and off-site effects [43] . Second, the EVF should function well in non-Western cultures (often found in parts of the world of great conservation importance [38] ) by downplaying the 'humans vs. nature' [44] and 'cultural vs. material' [36] dualisms typical of Western worldviews and recognising instead how people's cultural identity and well-being may be closely bound up in relationships with the non-human world [10] . Finally, the independent philosophical foundations of the EVF should give confidence in its robustness and universal validity.
Adopting the twelve aspects of valuation would provide a standard that should assist in comparison among studies, although ongoing work will be required to apply them through developing protocols and metrics (see Outstanding Questions).
In focusing on human experience, an EVF might be seen as aloof from natural science research [45] .
It elicits, however, a more ecological approach as its complement. Focusing instead on a set of ecological processes such as pollination, predation and nutrient cycling, one can examine how these underlie and influence the lives of humans and other animals in diverse ways. Such ecological effects analyses, as we might call them, align with the notions of supporting services and natural capital. They would include many of the biophysical ES valuations already popular with ecologists [46] , and so the question of how they should contribute to EVF assessments is clearly of pressing importance (see Outstanding Questions). But we believe that this is the correct prioritisation for the concerns of nature conservation and sustainable development, even as convergence is sought among the multiple framings of conservation [47] . An EVF should provide a more consistent and holistic starting point for most of the applications currently addressed using the ESF, as well as a rationale for interpreting ecological effects analyses. After all, direct human perception is the foundation of scientific research as well as environmental appreciation. Spiritual services for interested parties a This is one of the typical aims of a whole ecosystem valuation exercise. 
Box 1: Backgrounds to aspectual theory and value theory
Aspectual theory:
Aspectual theory is a postulate of the reformational philosophical tradition, which was established in the first half of the 20 th century by Herman Dooyeweerd and Dirk Vollenhoven [49] as an alternative to the dualistic thought that pervades Western culture [50] . It is a phenomenological framework to account for, among other things, how humans abstract from the integral everyday experience of reality and analyse objects or situations by abstracting selected aspects, which can be seen as fundamenta lly distinct modes of being and functioning [51] . Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven identified fiftee n mutually-irreducible aspects, although such a list is open to empirical revision. Aspects provide an intuitive categorisation of the diversity of meanings that can be ascribed to an object, phenomenon or situation. Reformational philosophy eschews reductionist claims about either an underlying substance ('matter') or social constructivism to explain our shared perceptions and posits instead a suite of natural laws that cause similar aspects and norms to be discernible at all times and across all cultures.
Conflating the aspects is a common source of paradoxes, such as Zeno's (reducing the kinetic aspect to the spatial) and Theseus' (conflating the physical aspect with others such as the formative).
Dooyeweerd [49] found specific dependencies among the aspects. [52] ). Thus a comprehensive multi-aspectual assessment by a given stakeholder should have an inner coherence that is lost in combining isolated judgements about, say, the beauty or intrins ic value of a place. Also, since each aspect may be the focus of an academic discipline (Table 2) , their integral coherence and mutual irreducibility cautions against attempts to seek an authorita tive assessment from any single discipline. On the contrary, inter-disciplinarity is encouraged.
Value theory:
Whereas traditional ethical theorising focuses on how a person may choose the "right" course of action, value theory (related to axiology)focuses on how people attribute 'goodness' to different entities or situations according to their properties [53] . While this approach avoids the traditional dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological ethics, it raises its own questions about extrinsic vs intrinsic, and conditional vs unconditional, values [54] . A strand of thought aligned with our proposal sees values as context-dependent. For example, Judith Thomson [55] argues that 'good' is meaningless without a context: one must understand some way in which a thing X is good, such as "for purpose P" or "for the wellbeing of subject S" -so that we can understand the contrasting senses of attributions like "good for cane toads" and "good for killing cane toads", as well as divergent forms of goodness such as generosity, justice and beauty. Accepting the fundamental multiplexity of goodness actually makes a consequentialist analysis problematic, since divergent values cannot be reduced to a common currency in order to assess the "best" course of action [56] .
Aspectual theory lends itself to this view rather well. Thus the columns of examples in Table 2 may be read as ways in which a place may be good for particular people and their interests. The alleged comprehensiveness of the suite of aspects suggests that they can encompass all the possible kinds of value that might be invoked in the discourses of conservation and sustainable development.
Box 2: The Ecosystem Valuing Framework
The ecosystem valuing framework (EVF) proposed here is a set of 12 categories for a systematic analysis of how specified stakeholders value a place or ecosystem. Each category evokes a distinct aspect of the place, as outlined in Fig. 1 and Table 2 . Below is a summary of the framework and some of the advantages it offers over the ESF:
 The EVF is a tool to consider the ways in which sites may be appreciated holistically, without applying the consumeristic category of services: it entails asking 'how' rather than 'what' people appreciate. The starting assumption is that any stakeholder will value any given place to varying degrees (including negatively) in each of the 12 aspects, and an evaluation therefore consists in attributing relative scores on as many as possible of these axes of valuation. They would naturally be presented graphically on a radar diagram.
 It is essential to specify at the outset which stakeholders are being considered. This necessitates consultation or at least empathy (e.g. if any non-human animals' values are to be considered [57] ). Dialogue and diplomacy may then be required for reaching a consensus for action.
 In practice, evaluations might be either site-focused (e.g. for prioritisation exercises, considering all interested stakeholders) or stakeholder-focused (e.g. for policy development, considering many sites and various spatial and temporal horizons).
 For translating between the ESF and the EVF it may be helpful to conceive of most regulating services initially in terms of the physical aspect of appreciation and of provisioning services in terms of the physical and biotic aspects. However, the EVF does not directly cover the notions of services or benefits: thus timber as a commodity or CO2 as a disutility, for example, cannot be directly considered. Meanwhile, the ambiguity of 'cultural services' can be lessened by using the full suite of aspects of appreciation.  The EVF intrinsically makes the normative nature of conservation explicit, facilitating the identification of negative as well as positive considerations, and "maintaining a plurality of values up to the point of decision-making" [28] . With the EVF, this "plurality of values" can be positivised as "a dozen (or more) evaluative scores".
